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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Sl A'J F OF

UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 19090

-v-

GOROON P. GRAVES
Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with Possession of a Stolen
Motor Vehicle, a third-degree felony,

in violation of Utah

Code Ann, S 41-1-112 (1981).

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
In a bench trial held January 10, 1983, in the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding, appellant was tried and
convicted of possession of a stolen motor vehicle.

On January

26, 1983, appellant was sentenced to serve zero to five years
in

the Utah State Prison and fined $1,000 as provided by law.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment and
'e·ntence imposed by the lower court.

was arrested and was later charged with possesion of a stolen
motur

vehicle (R, 9: T. 7, 10, 12-13).
At trial, Officer Lindsay testified that he did not

l'ay much attention to the speed of the truck as he followed it

(L 11).

He assumed that it was only going about 20 or 25

miles per hour (T. 11).

And except at the truck stop, where

appellant slowed down in the parking area, the officer did not
recall seeing appellant speed up or slow down significantly
during the time that he was being followed (T. 14-15).

When

asked if appellant had taken any evasive action during that
period, the officer responded:

"Not that I would -- unless he

was trying to lose me in [the truck stop], which he was
unsuccessful"

(T. 15}.

The truck that appellant was driving had been stolen
from Asphalt sales Company (T. 4, 9).

At trial, defense

counsel stipulated that Asphalt Sales owned a 1982 GMC truck,
license no. LC 1991: that it discovered its truck to be
missing from its shop on May 15, 1982: that it did not know
who had taken the vehicle: that no one was authorized to take
the vehicle: and that appellant was neither known nor employed
hy the

personnel at Asphalt Sales ( T. 4}.
The record does not indicate that appellant offered

an explanation to officer Lindsay, at the time he was stopped
by

the latter on 2100 South, regarding his unauthorized

r•rissession of the truck.

Neither was any evidence adduced at

t1ial to justify or explain that possession (T. 19).

-3-

Leuck in his possession, and (3) that appellant knew or had
reasnn to believe that the truck was stolen.

Appellant does

not dispute that the first two elements of the crime were
proved.

The issue, then, is whether there was sufficient

evidence adduced at trial to support a finding by Judge
Wilkinson that appellant knew or had reason to believe that
the truck he possessed was stolen.
One acts with knowledge when he is aware of the
nature of the existing circumstances.
§

76-2-103(2)

(1978).

Utah Code Ann.

Since guilty knowledge, like intent, is

a state of mind and is rarely capable of direct and positive
proof, it may be inferred by the trier of fact from the
actions of the defendant and from surrounding facts of
circumstances.

See State v. Murphy, Utah, 674 P.2d 1220, 1223

(1983): State v. Brooks, Utah, 631 P.2d 878, 881 (1981).
With regard to permissible inferences, or
presumptions of fact (as they are often called), the Court in
State v. Brooks said:
This Court has defined an "inference" as a
logical and reasonable conclusion of the
existence of a fact in a case, not
presented by direct evidence as to the
existence of the fact itself, but inferred
from the establishment of other facts from
which by a process of logic and reason,
based upon common experience, the
existence of the assumed fact may be
concluded by the trier of fact.
An
inference does not disappear from a case
but goes to the fact trier to be weighed
along with the contravening evidence
because all inferences, which are capable

-5-

Not only is it "deeply rooted in our law," id. at
it is a rational inference.

As indicated in United

states v. Taylor, 334 F. Supp. 1050 (D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 469
F.2d 284 ( 3d Cir. 1972):
[T)he presumption of guilty knowledge
that arises from recent possession of
stolen goods is not statutory in origin,
but is a long recognized rule of common
law.
It is supported by good sense and
everyday experience:
United States v.
Coppola, 424 F.2d 991, 993 (2d Cir. l970).
For centuries, unexplained possession of
recently stolen property has been accepted
as evidence of wrong-doing. As a
permissible inference for the jury, it
satisfies the requirements of due process:
United States v. Johnson, 140 U.S. App.
D.C. 54, 433 F.2d 1160, 1169 (1970).
Id. at 1057 (emphasis added).

And in

case, the

Court affirmed the court of Appeals' finding that there is no
lack of "rational connection" between unexplained possession
of recently stolen property and knowledge that the property is
stolen.

Barnes, 412 U.S. at 841, 843-846, 846 n.11.
Statutory and case law in Utah also recognize the

validity of the inference of guilty knowledge in such

States, 165 u.s. 486, 502-503 (1897).
Many state supreme
have also upheld the use of this inference.
29 Am.
Jr. 2d Evidences 229 (1967 & supp. 1983), and cases cited
therein,
cases fran nearby states which have so held include
Wells v. People, 197 Colo. 350, 354-355, 592 P.2d 1321,
1324-1325 (1979) (instruction on knowledge presumption of
ancient vintage), Hughes v. State, 536 P.2d 990, 992-993 (Okla
\rim. App. 1975) (per curiam); People v. Lyons, 50 Cal. 2d
245, 258, 324 P.2d 556, 562 (1958); State v. Salzman, 186
Wash, 44, 47, 56 P.2d 1005, 1007 ( 1936).

courts
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che c;ame with regard to burglary).

Regarding the inference

c(Jntained in the former larceny statute, the Kirkman Court
observed:
This statute has nothing to do with
burglary and applies only to charges of
stealing.
However, one who has possession
of recently stolen property would be faced
with the situation of having adverse
inferences drawn against him, and such
inferences together with all the other
evidence might be enough to convince a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was guilty of larceny even in
the absence of the statute above quoted.
The same adverse inference will
confront a defendant in a burglary case
where he has possession of recently stolen
property which could have been obtained
only by a burglarious entry into a
building. There would be a duty upon the
one in possession of such property to
explain his possession if he is to remove
that adverse inference against him
pointing toward his guilt; and if he gives
a false account of how he acquired that
possession, or having a reasonable
opportunity to show that his possession
was honestly acquired he refuses or fails
to do so, such conduct is a circumstance
which may be considered by the jury along
with all other evidence bearing upon the
case in determining guilt or innocence.
20 Utah 2d at 46, 432 P.2d at 638-639 (emphasis added).
other jurisdictions have also extended the inference
to robtery cases.

v. People, 197 Colo, 350,

354-355, 592 P.2d 1321, 1324-1325 (1979), and cases cited
lherein.

Still others have extended its application to cases

of "receiving and possessing stolen property."
fombs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 341 S.W.2d 774, 775 (1960)

-9-

Finally, that the inference may be validly drawn
w1Lt1 regards

to cases involving stolen vehicles is further

evidenced by the federal courts' application of the inference
in cases brought under the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act,
or Dyer Act

[18 U.S.C. SS 2311-2313 (1982)).

See 15 A.L.R.

fed. 856 (1973 & Supp. 1983), and cases cited therein.
Summarizing the law as applied in those cases, American Law
Reports notes the following:
[U)nexplained possession is deemed guilty
possession • • • and this may serve to
permit an inference that the possessor,
whether or not he is shown to have been
the thief, knew that the vehicle was
stolen . • , •
Id. at 859.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held, for

example, that
possession by the defendant of the
recently stolen automobile justifies the
inference that the possession is guilty
possession and may be of controlling
weight unless explained by the
circumstances or accounted for in some way
consistent with innocence.
[Seefeldt v.
United States, 183 F.2d 713, 715 {10th
Cir. 1950)).
McManaman v. United States, 327 F.2d 21, 25 n.3 (10th Cir.
1964).

See also Garrison v. United States, 353 F.2d 94, 95

(10th Cir. 1965)

(Utah case).

The federal courts' application

of this inference to cases involvina the possession of stolen
mntor vehicles is logical and supports the conclusion that the

inference should apply in cases prosecuted pursuant to similar
laws, such as S 41-1-112.

-11-

1r,1,

459 P.2d 763 (1969).

And, as recognized by this Court:

[I]t is a fact of life that one in
possession of stolen property who makes no
explanation as to how he came in
possession is apt to be under some adverse
consideration as to his honesty; and if he
has an explanation as to how he
innocently came into possession of the
stolen property, he would certainly
improve his situation by giving his
account of how it happened to the [trier
of fact] •
State v. Murphy, Utah, 617 P.2d 399, 405 (1980).
Fourth, appellant was found drivino the truck less
than two months after it had disappeared from the owner's
place of business (T. 4, 6-7, 13-14, 19l
possession of recently stolen property.

and thus was in
See State v. Merritt,

67 Utah at 335-336, 247 P. at 501 (four months was not "of

such length as to take the case out of the category of
'property recently stolen'"); United States v. Robertson, 417
F.2d 873, 878 n.2 (5th Cir. 1969) (the shorter the period
between the theft and defendant's possession, the stronger the
inference of guilt).
Under these circumstances, the trial judge could
properly have inferred that appellant knew that the truck he
was stolen, and having found that element, concluded
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had violated

s

4]-1-112.
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence supportino a conviction, this Court has applied
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